On the face of it, fMRI data are ill suited to the task of informing cognitive theory. As two neuroscientists neé psychologists, we are both interested in drawing conclusions about cognition using fMRI data. We recognize, however, that fMRI experiments by nature only permit causal inferences about brain states (namely, how variations in cognitive states affect the brain; Henson, 2005; Weber & Thompson-Schill, 2010) . To reverse this inference and draw conclusions about cognition from fMRI data, one must make strong assumptions about the relation between brain and cognition that are, as we will explain, open to question. However, we argue that fMRI data have nonetheless advanced at least one cognitive theory in ways that had not been and, arguably, would not be possible without them.
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There are many reasons why one might observe dissociations and associations between mental states and brain states, not all of which inform cognitive theory. Consider the dissociation between the neural responses elicited by visual stimuli in the left versus the right visual field; the difference in brain state (which correlates with the difference in stimulus location and the ensuing mental state) does not warrant the conclusion that, in any interesting sense, different cognitive operations are reflected in these two responses. More generally, a neural dissociation can be used to infer a functional (cognitive) dissociation only if there is an isomorphic and invariant relationship between the cognitive process of interest and the pattern of neural activity that supports the process (Rugg & Coles, 1995) .
Put another way, if the same cognitive process is associated with more than one pattern of neural activity, then neural measures cannot easily be used to determine when the process is active and when it is not. Conversely, computationally distinct operations may be mediated by cohabiting neuronal populations (e.g., M and P cells in V1) whose differential activation is undetectable at the spatial scale afforded by fMRI. Thus, the finding that two tasks elicit colocalized (overlapping) patterns of activity does not necessarily imply that the tasks engaged functionally equivalent cognitive processes. Almost invariably, though, using fMRI to make a cognitive inference hinges upon the demonstration of either dissociable or colocalized patterns of task-related fMRI signals. But as we just noted, such inferences are valid only if there is a one-to-one relationship between the pattern of fMRI activity elicited during a task and the cognitive processes that the task engages. The two examples just given demonstrate that inferences along these lines are not necessarily valid.
The challenge raised by this special section is to identify cases in which, despite this caveat, our understanding of some aspect of cognition has been advanced with neuroimaging data. As we discuss later in this article, although cognitive inferences made from fMRI data alone would be suspect in many circumstances, their convergence with other sources of evidence lends credence to their interpretation. However, our remit, as we understand it, is to identify an advance to a cognitive theory that had not (or, stronger still, could not have) been made using other methods from either the psychologist's or neuroscientist's toolbox. If, in the absence of convergent evidence, one cannot rely on either dissociation or colocalization in patterns of fMRI data to make a cognitive inference, this effort would seem hopeless. We have turned to an example in which the cognitive advance arises from neither a dissociation nor an association but, instead, from both.
Our argument begins in 1985, although precursors to these ideas are found in Sigmund Freud's On Aphasia and in embryonic form in John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; but, we begin with Allport (1985) , who states:
The essential idea is that the same neural elements that are involved in coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to eye or hand or ear also make up the elements of the auto-associated activity-patterns that represent familiar object-concepts in 'semantic memory'. This model is, of course, in radical opposition to the view, apparently held by many psychologists, that 'semantic memory' is represented in some abstract, modality-independent, 'conceptual' domain remote from the mechanisms of perception and of motor organization. (p. 53, emphasis in original)
In this seminal chapter, Allport's primary goal was to argue that information is represented as distributed patterns; however, he went a step further by proposing that, for object knowledge (i.e., "semantic memory"), these patterns in memory are shared with patterns evoked during perception. Allport sets the stage for the relevance of neural data for this proposal by arguing that "we need also to have a model of functionally separable components at the neural (implementation) level" (p. 39, emphasis in original).
Today, Allport's hypothesis is bundled into the umbrella theory of embodied cognition: rather than viewing cognition as a separate set of processes from those that compose our perception and action systems, we can describe cognition as the extension of these systems. Beyond mere parsimony, the embodied cognition approach to knowledge representation has the advantage of circumventing the symbol grounding problem-that is, the problem of how meanings become connected to the world. Embodied cognition answers this problem by connecting cognition with the world via sensory and motor processes. For this reason, the framework is appealing, and evidence for modal semantic memory representations is widely touted-for example, in a 2003 review, Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, and Wilson (2003) summarized the state of the field with, "these empirical results and theoretical analyses implicate modality-specific systems in the representation and use of conceptual knowledge" (p. 84). What are the empirical results? There are several reviews of relevant findings (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003; Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003) , and we offer here one brief summary of the neuroimaging data that have been argued to support embodied cognition accounts:
Conceptualizing the colors of objects activates a brain area near V4, the area that processes color sensations. Conceptualizing object form activates areas near brain centers for perceiving form. Conceptualizing object motion activates areas near brain centers for perceiving motion. (Barsalou et al., 2003, p. 87) This quotation, which comes from a review championing the embodied cognition account, contains an important word in each of the three sentences, which is the basis for the argument we develop below: "near". "Near" is not "same." Thus, one could argue that these fMRI findings, often marshaled to defend embodied theories of concepts, could be said to refute them.
So have fMRI data contributed to our understanding of concept representation? As we have argued, dissociable patterns of activation cannot necessarily be used to infer dissociable cognitive processes, because the same process might be subserved by multiple neural populations. Put in these terms, our earlier excerpt from Allport (1985) makes the erroneous assumption that there is an isomorphism between neural elements and cognitive processing. But without that assumption, we should conclude nothing about the status of embodied cognition theories from these data. Similarly, the colocalization of activation would tell us nothing about the grounding of meaning in sensorimotor systems, as we cannot be confident that the colocalization reflects activation of the same neural populations (cf. Mahon & Caramazza, 2008 ). Yet, we suggest that the observation of near (but not same) activation patterns in memory and perception (or action) has indeed moved the field forward.
We make our argument in the domain of color, but it could in principle apply to form, motion, or action. Much of the seminal work in the retrieval of color knowledge was conducted by Alex Martin and his colleagues, who were the first to compare the fMRI response to color perception and color knowledge retrieval in the same subjects (Chao & Martin, 1999) : Whereas passive viewing of chromatic stimuli activated the lingual gyrus, naming the colors of common objects activated a more anterior region in the fusiform gyrus-thus, near, but not the same. In response to the challenge that this finding creates for embodied cognition theories, Simmons and colleagues (2007) compared fMRI responses during color perception and color memory retrieval using a more demanding perceptual task (Beauchamp, Haxby, Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999) . They observed color-selective activity during perception in both the posterior lingual and anterior fusiform regions, the latter overlapping with the activity evoked during color memory retrieval. In other words, by changing the processing demands of the perception task, they changed the resulting pattern of activation such that it partially overlapped with the anteriorally shifted activity elicited during retrieval of color information from memory. Simmons et al. (2007) discussed these two regions with regard to levels of color representation and posited that there are low-and high-level representations, supported by different anatomical substrates (distributed along the posterior-anterior axis), that contribute differentially to perception and memory. Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver, Schlichting, and Thompson-Schill (2011) adopted a complementary strategy, varying the memory task rather than the perception task. These authors manipulated the color information required to perform the task (high-fidelity color representations to determine that a strawberry is a closer shade of red to a tomato than it is to a raspberry vs. lower fidelity color representations sufficient to determine that a strawberry is a closer color match to a cherry than to a lemon). Hsu et al. also measured subjects' selfreported tendency to prefer visualizing rather than verbalizing information. They found that both task and subject factors affected the amount of overlap between the activity elicited during the memory and perception tasks.
The finding that the overlap between cortical regions involved in color perception and color memory is task dependent is, to our knowledge, unique to fMRI studies. Indeed, with the possible exception of the closely related but largely superseded method of positron emission tomography, it is arguable that no other method possesses the combination of spatial resolution and coverage necessary to identify this phenomenon. In particular, it is difficult to imagine analogous findings emerging from a lesion-deficit study, given the very high spatial specificity that would be required of the lesions.
We argue that the findings of Simmons et al. (2007) and Hsu et al. (2011) have both contributed in an important way to our knowledge of the relation between color memory and color perception and to embodied cognition theories more generally, reconciling Allport's (1985) predictions with the anterior shift from perception to memory observed in early fMRI reports. The findings lead to the hypothesis that a given feature or property (such as color) is represented at multiple levels of abstraction (such that abstraction increases in more anterior regions) and that both perception and memory can tap into these varying representations. Although there might be a tendency for perceptual tasks to recruit less abstract representations and for memory tasks to recruit more abstract representations, both task and subject factors can influence which representations are involved in memory and perception (and might also influence whether a phenomenological experience of "imagery" accompanies memory retrieval).
Critically, this advance hinged neither on an association between activation patterns (i.e., coactivation during perception and memory) nor on a dissociation (differential activation between the two), but rather on the observation that the extent of association or dissociation can be systematically manipulated. This observation is crucial. That a dissociation can be transformed into an association by varying the specificity of the information required to perform a task rules out several theoretically uninteresting interpretations of the anterior shift. In particular, this finding is inconsistent with an interpretation of the shift in terms of differences in neural activity that merely reflect whether input to a functionally homogeneous cortical region is bottom-up or top-down. When Simmons et al. (2007) reported the first evidence of direct overlap between memory and perception, they suggested that "it will be important for future research to articulate the commonalities and boundaries between perception and knowledge, if we are to develop satisfactory process-level accounts of these fundamental cognitive abilities" (p. 2809). We argue that fMRI data have done just that.
Although we have identified a case in which it can be argued that fMRI has uniquely advanced a cognitive theory, we acknowledge that such cases are rare. We therefore conclude by asking how fMRI can be employed to inform cognitive theory more generally. We have already noted that cognitive inferences based on patterns of dissociations or associations in fMRI data rest on strong and (at present) unverifiable assumptions. This is no less true however of any other methodology, including those that rely on behavioral rather than neural measures, such as the study of healthy or brain-lesioned individuals. We argue that the value of fMRI as a tool to inform cognitive theory is best realized when findings from the method are integrated with findings from other methods that, although no less assumption bound, depend on different assumptions. In short, we are making the mundane point that convergent evidence from multiple methods is preferable to evidence obtained with any single method. From this perspective, the assumptions underlying the use of fMRI to make inferences about cognitive theory are much less daunting than when the method is viewed in isolation.
